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A PICTURE IS WORTH 1,000 WORDS, OR $6,637.94

Imagine a young woman, Elaine, who is a gifted photographer.
She launches a small photography business with her husband, and
soon she is in demand throughout the state. Her specialty is weddings.
One day Elaine receives a request to photograph a same-sex
commitment ceremony. Politely, she declines, explaining that she only
photographs traditional weddings. Several months later, she is
contacted by the state's Human Rights Commission. Elaine learns
that a complaint has been filed against her, and she is being charged
with discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
Imagine a young man, Michael, who is a gifted filmmaker.
While his true gift lies in the creation of short films and
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documentaries, Michael funds his passion by shooting various
advertisements and other more "commercial" projects. As the next
presidential election draws near, Michael is approached and asked to
film an ad for the challenger, a conservative, gun-toting business
owner of a multinational corporation who favors an increase in oil
exploration and owns a fleet of gas-guzzling SUVs. While flattered,
Michael has long supported the liberal incumbent, and has already
produced several ads for his campaign. Therefore, he politely declines.
Within weeks, a complaint is filed against Michael for discriminating
on the basis of political ideology.
One of these scenarios is all too real, and Elaine's business,
Elane Photography, was forced to pay fees in excess of $6,000.1 The
second could quickly become a reality, as the legal framework already
exists to sustain it.2 While state, and later federal, public
accommodation laws proscribing discrimination have played a key role
3
in "protecting the civil rights of historically disadvantaged groups,"
defenders of liberty should agree that decisions which force a
Christian photographer to provide services for a same-sex
commitment ceremony or force a liberal filmmaker to shoot political
advertisements for conservative candidates are untenable. Indeed,
these situations are readily distinguishable from a hotel owner
refusing to provide lodging for blacks in violation of the Civil Rights
4
Act of 1964.
The reason decisions like the one in Willock v. Elane
Photography feel different is simple: they are different. Elaine's
situation involved more than opening her business to the public.
Rather, Elaine-by being told that she must use the expressive art of
photography to communicate a particular message about same-sex
commitment ceremonies-was compelled to express a viewpoint she
disagreed with, in violation of her First Amendment free speech

Willock, HRD No. 06-12-20-0685 (N.M. Human Rights Comm'n Apr. 9, 2008) (final
1.
order), available at http://www.telladf.org/UserDocs/ElaneRuling.pdf; see Chris Potts, Point &
Shoot, TRUTH & TRIUMPH, Feb. 2009, at 6 (describing the story of Elaine Huguenin) (on file with
author).
2.
See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 2-1402.31(a) (2001) (making it unlawful to discriminate based on
political affiliation); SEArrLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 14.08.020(M) (2010) (dealing with housing,
and defining "discrimination" to include political ideology), cited in Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale,
530 U.S. 640, 656 n.2 (2000).
3.
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984) (explaining the primary role that
state public accommodation laws played prior to federal legislation in this arena).
4.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201, 78 Stat. 243 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006); see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
247, 250 (1964) (discussing the accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
their purpose).

964

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:3:961

rights. Similarly, forcing Michael to use the medium of videography to
communicate a message about a particular candidate would be a
violation of his First Amendment rights. Despite the distinctness of
cases like Elane Photography, the state district court hearing Elaine's
case concluded that the law did not infringe on Elaine's First
Amendment rights because the law simply prohibited the "act of
discriminati[on]." 5 However, the Supreme Court has explicitly heldin the very case cited by the district court for its rationale-that
attempting to end discrimination does not supply a sufficient
justification for applying public accommodation laws to expressive
conduct. 6 To find otherwise could produce results that run contrary to
national ideals of justice and autonomy by forcing an individual to
engage in expression that violates his or her beliefs. With these ideals
at stake, greater clarity is needed in the area of public accommodation
laws. The expansion of such laws has resulted in an increase in cases
like Elane Photography,and courts must be able to evaluate properly
the interests involved when public accommodation laws clash with
free speech rights.
This Note examines the limits of public accommodation antidiscrimination laws as they pertain to private businesses. Part I
explores the origins and development of public accommodation laws,
paying close attention to their original purpose as compared to their
contemporary implementation. It also reviews the development of
First Amendment jurisprudence and the protection the Supreme
Court has provided for speech. Using Elane Photography as an
example, Part II demonstrates the failure of some courts to properly
analyze cases involving expressive conduct by a private business that
falls within the bounds of First Amendment protection. Part III
concludes that public accommodation laws violate the First
Amendment when they compel expression by private businesses, such
as Elane Photography. To remedy this constitutional violation, Part
III first proposes that legislatures more carefully delineate the reach
of-and groups covered by-public accommodation laws. Second, it
urges courts to apply more consistently the Supreme Court's standard
for expressive activity and look to Hurley v. Irish American Gay,
Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston for guidance in balancing
governmental interests against First Amendment protections.

5.
Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, No. CV-2008-06632,
22 (N.M. Jud. Dist. Ct.
Dec. 11, 2009) (citing Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557,
572 (1995)), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/24425459/Elainte-Photography-LLC.vVanessa-Willock-N-M-2nd-Dist-2008-06632-Dec-11-2009.
6.
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 578-79.
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I. HISTORY OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION LAWS AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT

A. Accommodation to Domination: The Growth of Public
Accommodation Anti-DiscriminationLaws
Public accommodation laws have come a long way since the
beginning of the Civil Rights Era. Early legislation proscribing
discrimination in places of public accommodation was focused
primarily, if not exclusively, on discrimination based on race or color.
Indeed, the federal government's first foray into public accommodation
laws came with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which
inns, public conveyances,
prohibited such discrimination in access to
7
and places of amusement such as theaters.
Although the intent of the Civil Rights Act was laudable, the
Act's initial impact was short-lived. Just eight years after its passage,
the Supreme Court found the Act unconstitutional in the Civil Rights
Cases.8 This early setback in federal efforts shifted the responsibility
of proscribing discrimination to the states, which they accepted, albeit
slowly. As with the early federal legislation, these state statutes
focused on discrimination based on race or color. 9 Massachusetts
entered the field first; 10 in fact, its statute predated even the Civil
Rights Act of 1875.11 New York and Kansas followed nine years
later. 12 Other states passed similar laws during the next two decades,
including eleven between 1883 and 1885, and states continued to act
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 13 The federal
government reentered the arena with the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which "was enacted with a spirit of justice and equality in order to

Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875), invalidated by The Civil Rights
7.
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
109 U.S. 3 (1883); see also 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS § 1:4 (3d
8.
ed. 2009) (discussing the Civil Rights Cases and the constitutional framework of civil rights law).
See, e.g., Act Forbidding Unjust Discrimination on Account of Color or Race (Mass.
9.
Discrimination Act), 1865 Mass. Acts ch. 277, reprinted in MILTON KONVITZ, A CENTURY OF CIVIL
RIGHTS 156 (1961) (prohibiting discrimination based on race or color "in any licensed inn, in any
public place of amusement, public conveyance or public meeting"); see also Lisa Gabrielle
Lerman & Annette K. Sanderson, Discriminationin Access to Public Places: A Survey of State
and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 215, 238-39 (1978)
(discussing the history of state public accommodations statutes).
10. See Mass. Discrimination Act; Hurley, 515 U.S. at 571 (citing Lerman & Sanderson,
supranote 9).
See Mass. Discrimination Act.
11.
12. Lerman & Sanderson, supranote 9, at 238.
13. Id. at 239.
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remove racial discriminationfrom certain facilities which are open to
14
the general public."'
These early laws not only focused specifically on race
discrimination, but also narrowly defined "public accommodation."
Beginning with the Civil Rights Act of 1875, statutes commonly
included inns, theaters, restaurants, and other "places of public
amusement."'15 Similarly, the Massachusetts law covered only places
providing "certain essential goods and services."'16 When President
John F. Kennedy urged Congress to act in 1963, he asked that they
pass legislation requiring "equal service in places of public
accommodation, such as hotels and restaurants and theaters and
retail stores."'17 This plea culminated in the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,18 which continued to define public accommodations
narrowly. In order to be a public accommodation under the Act, an
establishment (1) must affect commerce or (2) its discrimination must
be supported by state action. The establishment must also fall within
one of the following four categories:
(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient
guests,...
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility
principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, ...
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place
of exhibition or entertainment; and
(4) any establishment (A)(i) which is physically located within the premises of any
establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or (ii) within the premises of which
is physically located any such covered establishment, and (B) which holds itself out as
serving patrons of such covered establishment. 19

These categories are further limited by the meaning of
"commerce" within the section of the statute. 20 In category two,
commerce is limited to establishments that "serve[] or offer[] to serve

14. Miller v. Amusement Enters., Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 352 (5th Cir. 1968) (emphasis added)
(discussing Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006)); see also SMOLLA, supra note 8, at
§ 7:2 (discussing the purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875), invalidated by The Civil Rights
15.
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
16. Lerman & Sanderson, supranote 9, at 238.
17. President John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American People on
Civil Rights (Jun. 11, 1963), available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/ReadyReference/JFK-Speeches/Radio-and-Television-Report-to-theAmerican-People-on-Civil-RightsJune-11-1963.aspx.
18. The People's Vote: Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. NEWS, http://www.usnews.comlusnewsl
documents/docpages/document-page97.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
19.
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b).
20. Id. § 2000a(b)-(c).
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interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves,
21
or gasoline or other products which it sells, has moved in commerce."
Category three is limited to those establishments that "customarily
present[ ] films, performances, athletic teams, exhibitions, or other
22
sources of entertainment which move in commerce."
Current state public accommodation laws have cast off their
historical roots and embrace a wide range of business activity. 23 New
Jersey is a typical example, where "public accommodation" includesbut is not limited to-more than fifty types of places. 24 While some of
the locations included are consistent with a traditional understanding
of public accommodations, such as restaurants and public libraries,
the list also includes places such as summer camps, shooting galleries,
and roof gardens. 25 Moreover, while traditional laws like the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 cover establishments "principally engaged" in
selling food, 26 the New Jersey statute covers "any restaurant, eating
27
house, or place where food is sold for consumption on the premises."
This language conceivably allows businesses that only incidentally
make food available for sale to be subject to the act. The law also has a
catch-all provision, which encompasses "any producer, manufacturer,
wholesaler, distributor, retail shop, store, establishment, or concession
dealing with goods or services of any kind."28 In other words, a New
Jersey business of any type, carrying on any activity, likely falls
within the state's definition of a "public accommodation."
Current laws also include a larger number of groups as
protected classes. A District of Columbia statute covers not just
discrimination based on race and color, but also "religion, national
origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual
orientation, gender identity or expression, familial status, family
responsibilities, genetic information, disability, matriculation, political
affiliation, source of income, or place of residence or business of any

21. Id. § 2000a(c).
22. Id.
23. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 571-72
(1995) (tracing the expansion of Massachusetts antidiscrimination law).
24. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5() (West Supp. 2010); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,
657 (2000).
25.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5().

26.

42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b).

27.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5().

28.

Id.
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individual."29 The New Jersey statute mentioned 0above is similarly
3
broad with respect to the variety of classes covered.
This significant increase in coverage comes at a price. As the
Supreme Court has noted, such changes have increased "the potential
for conflict between state public accommodations laws and the First
Amendment rights of organizations." 31 Indeed, the more broadly these
laws are written, the larger the shadow they cast over First
32
Amendment free speech rights.
B. Free Speech: Some Restrictions May Apply, See Your State for
Details
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech." 33 This protection extends to
corporate speakers as well as private individuals,3 4 covers more than
36
spoken words, 35 and includes a right of silence.
1. First Amendment Protection Extends to Corporate Speakers
The Supreme Court stated in Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v.
Public Utilities Commission of Californiathat "speech does not lose its
protection because of the corporate identity of the speaker."37 In 2010,
the Court reaffirmed this principle in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission, stating plainly, "First Amendment protection

29. D.C. CODE § 2-1402.31(a) (2001); see Dale, 530 U.S. at 656 n.2 (2000) (drawing
attention to the D.C. law's inclusion of personal appearance, source of income, and place or
residence as bases for discrimination).
30. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2006).
31. Dale, 530 U.S. at 657.
32. This unrestrained expansion of public accommodation laws raises an important legal
question addressed only briefly by this Note in Part IV: Are there inherent limits on the state's
power to add prohibited classifications under a discrimination law? Is the Constitution the only
limiting restraint on state power in this area of law? Moreover, are states in danger of debasing
or distorting the legal protections against discrimination when it places racial discrimination on
the same level as discrimination based on "political affiliation" or "source of income"?
33. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
34. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986) (citing First Nat'l
Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)).
35. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
36. Pac. Gas, 475 U.S. at 16; see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943) ("[N]o official . . . can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.").
37. Pac. Gas, 475 U.S. at 16.
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extends to corporations." 38 This principle holds regardless of whether
the speaker is being paid, a fact the Court noted in Riley v. National
Federationof the Blind of North Carolina,Inc.: "It is well settled that
a speaker's rights are not lost merely because compensation is
received; a speaker is no less a speaker because he or she is paid to
speak."

39

An important distinction must be drawn between speech by a
commercial entity and "commercial speech." The latter receives more
limited protection by the First Amendment, and applies to "expression
related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience." 40 Commercial speech is "generally in the form of
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods and services, or speech
proposing a commercial transaction."4 1 This Note addresses the former
category, speech by a commercial entity, which means that the
42
speaker is "no less a speaker" and his rights are not diminished.
Despite the broad protection afforded to speech made by commercial
entities, however, some commentators suggest that participating in
the marketplace should automatically "subject an enterprise to civil
43
rights laws" and deprive them of any First Amendment protection.
This approach-allowing for limits on speech made by commercial

38. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010) (citations omitted);
see also First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (finding that speech which
would otherwise be subject to protection is not forfeited based on the corporate identity of the
speaker and stating, "[t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the
public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or
individual").
39. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 801 (1988).
40. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980)
(emphasis added).
41.
16A AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 499 (2010) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added); see, e.g., United States v. Bell, 238 F. Supp. 2d 696, 703 (M.D. Pa. 2003) ("Commercial
speech is 'broadly defined as expression related to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience, generally in the form of a commercial advertisement for the sale of goods and
services.'" (quoting In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 193 F.3d 781, 793 (3d Cir.
1999))).
42. Riley, 487 U.S. at 801.
43. See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights and Religion, 72
BROOK. L. REV. 61, 119 n.158 (citing Mark Hager, Freedom of Solidarity: Why the Boy Scout Case
Was Rightly (But Wrongly) Decided, 35 CONN L. REV. 129, 157 (2002)) (arguing that
organizations participating in commerce should not be free to determine the rationale for their
exclusion of members); Maureen E. Markey, The Landlord/Tenant Free Exercise Conflict in a
Post-RFRA World, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 487, 549-52 (1998) (recommending no compelling state
interest should be necessary for anti-discrimination laws in free exercise cases when religious
individuals are engaging in voluntary commercial activity); Shelley K. Wessels, Note, The
Collision of Religious Exercise and Governmental NondiscriminationPolicies, 41 STAN. L. REV.
1201, 1231 (1989) (suggesting there should be no protection from civil rights laws when a
religious group provides services to others in the community).
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entities-is problematic for three primary reasons. First, it directly
contradicts a plain reading of the First Amendment, essentially
adding "except as it pertains to business" to the constitutional
mandate that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech." 44 Second, it contradicts Supreme Court decisions stating
that the First Amendment extends to commercial activity. 45 Third,
such an approach would, in essence, allow First Amendment
protection to vary from state to state, depending on the specific
46
language of each state's public accommodation laws.
2. Expressive Activity Falls Under the Protection of the
First Amendment
The First Amendment protects more than words 47-its
protection extends to "pictures, films, paintings, drawings, and
engravings." 48 The Court, perhaps recalling the old adage that a
picture is worth a thousand words, reasoned that "symbolism is a
primitive but effective way of communicating ideas."49 As such, the
Court has long recognized protection for a variety of popular-and
unpopular-expressive acts, including "saluting a flag (and refusing to
do so), wearing an armband to protest a war,... and even [m]arching,
50
walking or parading in uniforms displaying the swastika."
In evaluating whether conduct is sufficiently expressive to
invoke the First Amendment, the Court asks whether "an intent to
convey a particularized message was present, and whether the
likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those

who viewed

it."51

While some expressive words or conduct may be

easily identified, "protected expression may also take the form of quiet
persuasion, inculcation of traditional values, instruction of the young,

44. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
45. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986).
46. For instance, in a state including "sexual orientation" as a protected class, Elane
Photography would have no free speech rights, but in a state not including the classification, she
would be free to exercise her First Amendment rights.
47. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
48. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973); see also Plaintiffs Memorandum of
Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 21, Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock,
No. D-202-CV-200806632 (N.M. Jud. Dist. Ct. N.M. Jul. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Plaintiffs
Memorandum] (on file with author) (citing Kaplan).
49. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
632 (1943)).
50. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
51. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,
409-10 (1974)).
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and community service." 52 Though applying these factors may be
difficult in certain instances, some modes of expression, such as the
arts, are presumed to be expressive-and therefore deserving of
protection-without debate. In the context of artistic expression, "[i]t
goes without saying that artistic expression lies within ... First
Amendment protection," 53 and "is entitled to full protection
54
because... [of the] ideal of governmental viewpoint neutrality."
3. "Free Speech" Also Applies to Those Things You Choose
Not to Express
The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment
protects expression not only from being curtailed, but also from being
compelled. The First Amendment "protects the right of individuals to
hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to
foster... an idea they find morally objectionable." 55 It "prohibit[s]
improper restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas" which
includes "a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly." 56 Or, put
simply, freedom of speech "includes... the choice of what not to
say." 57 Therefore, the government cannot compel affirmance of a belief
with which the speaker disagrees. 58 When it attempts to do so, it
"invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of
the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official
59
control."
C. Key Cases Examining the Clash Between Public Accommodation
Laws and Free Speech
As the Supreme Court has observed, the expansion of public
accommodation laws has led to increasing conflicts with the First
Amendment. 60 While Elane Photography is unique in many ways, a
few Supreme Court cases reveal key principles necessary to arbitrate
52. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 636 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
53. Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 48, at 21 (quoting Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v.
Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602 (1998)).
54. Finley, 524 U.S. at 603 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)).
55. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
56. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986).
57. Id. at 16 (citing Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974))
(emphasis added).
58. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
59. Id.
60. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 657 (2000).
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the conflict. Specifically, the cases discussed below demonstrate that a
state "may not compel affirmance of a belief with which the speaker
disagrees," 61 even if the stated motivation is to "produce a society free
of... [discriminatory] biases." 62 The First Amendment protects the
right of a speaker to choose what to say, and also to choose "what not
63

to say."

1. Follow the Parade: Supreme Court Precedent Says
Free Speech Comes First
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of
Boston,64 the leading case illustrating the clash between public
accommodation laws and First Amendment free speech rights,
expresses the principle that free speech must take priority in such
conflicts. 65 In Hurley, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
Massachusetts violated the First Amendment by using its public
accommodations law to force parade organizers to include a group
"imparting a message the organizers do not wish to convey." 66 The
case involved a St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation Parade, organized since
1947 by private citizens and featuring up to 20,000 marchers and one
million viewers. 67 Although the parade was a private event, the city
nonetheless provided support, including funding, printing services,
68
and use of the city's official seal.
The case began after parade organizers refused to allow the
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston
("GLIB")-a group formed by gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of
Irish immigrants and other supporters-to march in the 1992 and
1993 parades. 69 The state trial court found the parade to be a public
accommodation 70 and rejected the argument that it was "private,"
noting there was little selectivity (even though the Ku Klux Klan had
been excluded) and declaring that "the only common theme among the
71
participants and sponsors is their public involvement in the Parade."
61. Hurley v, Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995)
(citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
62. Id. at 578.
63. Id. at 573.
64. Id. at 557.
65. Id. at 573.
66. Id. at 559.
67. Id. at 560-61.
68. Id. at 561.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 562 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The court also held that GLIB's inclusion would fail to infringe on the
First Amendment rights of parade organizers, since the parade was
not "focus[ed] on a specific message, theme, or group." 72 Finally, the
trial court held that "because the statute did not mandate inclusion of
GLIB but only prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation,
any infringement on the Council's right to expressive association was
only 'incidental' and 'no greater than necessary to accomplish the
statute's legitimate purpose' of eradicating discrimination." 73 The
74
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed.
A unanimous U.S. Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the logic
and rulings of the lower courts and holding that the state "may not
compel affirmance of a belief with which the speaker disagrees."7 5 The
Court found that the parade was expression deserving of First
Amendment protection, citing the broad understanding of expression
developed in previous cases, 76 and noting that if a parade were to
receive no media coverage, "it may as well not have happened." 77 The
Court added that this freedom of expression extends "not only to
expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to
statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid."7 8 This protection is
available for both "ordinary people" and "business corporations,"
including publishers, and is meant to "shield... those choices of
79
content that in someone's eyes are misguided, or even hurtful."
While the Court assumed without deciding that the parade could fall
within the meaning of "public accommodation" as defined by the
statute, it held that Massachusetts was effectively "declaring the
sponsors' speech itself to be the public accommodation," violating the
First Amendment right of a speaker to "choose the content of his own
message."8 0 Additionally, the Court stressed the right of speakers to
choose "what not to say."8 1 Moreover, the Court observed that the
organizers were not endeavoring to ban gays from the parade, but

72. Id. at 563 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id. (internal citations omitted).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 573 (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
76. Id. at 567.
77. Id. at 568 (quoting SUSAN G. DAVIS, PARADES AND POWER: STREET THEATRE IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY PHILADELPHIA 171 (1986)) (additional citations omitted).
78. Id. at 573 (citations omitted).
79. Id. at 574 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1 (1949)).
80. Id. at 573.
81. Id.; see also supranotes 56-59 and accompanying text.
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rather were excluding the pro-gay message that GLIB was attempting
82
to impose.
The Hurley Court also rejected the argument that the parade
83
could be seen as a passive conduit of another party's message.
Noting that the situation differed from one in which a cable company
presents "individual, unrelated segments," the Court stated that the
parade units are "understood to contribute something to a common
theme" and added that there is "no customary practice ... [to] disavow
any identity of viewpoint."8 4 Contrasting the parade with a situation
in which disclaimers may be posted near the speaker, such as at a
shopping mall, the Court noted that such a practice would be "quite
85
curious" if employed in a parade.
Finally, the Court soundly rejected any contention that a law
restricting speech would be permissible if its purpose was to "produce
a society free of ... [discriminatory] biases" 86:
The very idea that a noncommercial speech restriction be used to produce thoughts and
statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all people, grates on the First
Amendment, for it amounts to nothing less than a proposal to limit speech8 in
the service
7
of orthodox expression. The Speech Clause has no more certain antithesis.

The Court added that although the law may "promote all sorts
of conduct in place of harmful behavior," it may not "interfere with
speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose
may strike the government. 8 8 Applying these principles to the case at
hand, the Court held the parade organizers were free to exclude GLIB
89
from the parade, no matter what the reason.
Hurley was not the Court's first venture into the matter of
compelled speech. Decades before Hurley was decided, the Supreme
Court took to the road in defense of free speech. In Wooley v. Maynard,
the Supreme Court held that the state could not "require an individual

82. Id. at 572-73.
83. Id. at 576.
84. Id. (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994) (finding there was
little risk cable viewers would believe cable operators endorsed the messages conveyed via their
cable system)).
85. Id. at 576-77 (citing PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980)).
86. Id. at 578.
87. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 579 (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 20 (1986)). As discussed earlier,
the use of "noncommercial" should not be understood to eliminate applicability to cases such as
Elane Photography. See supra Part B.1. As New York Times Co. v. Sullivan makes clear, speech
is not "commercial" simply because a business has paid for it. 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
88. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 579.
89. Id. at 575.
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to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by
displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the express
purpose that it be observed and read by the public." 90 In this case,
New Hampshire citizen George Maynard sought relief after being
subjected to various sanctions for covering the state motto, "Live Free
or Die," on his license plate, in violation of state law. 91 The Court
noted that this law forced Maynard "to be an instrument for fostering
public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds
unacceptable. '92 Ruling against the state, the Court held the First
Amendment "protects the right of individuals to hold a point of view
different from the majority and to refuse to foster.., an idea they find
morally objectionable." 93 The Court further stated that "where the
State's interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how
acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual's
First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such
message." 94
2. Other Supreme Court Cases Support the Analysis in
Hurley and Wooley
Other Supreme Court cases have addressed this conflict
between the First Amendment and public accommodation laws in the
context of expressive association.While they are thus distinguishable
from Hurley, Wooley, and Elane Photography,the cases nevertheless
provide additional insight into the Court's analysis of this issue.
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Court faced the question
of whether New Jersey's public accommodation law violated the Boy
Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association by requiring
the Boy Scouts to admit a homosexual scoutmaster. 95 The Court
pointed to Hurley and concluded that the public accommodation law
would "interfere with the Boy Scouts' choice not to propound a point of
view contrary to its beliefs." 96 The Boy Scouts maintained that
"homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values embodied in the
Scout Oath and Law." 97 While the Court noted that these materials
did not expressly mention sexuality or sexual orientation, it held that

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977).
Id. at 707-09 & n.3.
Id. at 715.
Id.
Id. at 717.
530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000).
Id. at 654.
Id. at 650.
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"it is not the role of the courts to reject a group's expressed values
because they disagree with those values or find them internally
inconsistent."98
The Court went on to reject the New Jersey Supreme Court's
suggestion that an association must have the "purpose of
disseminating a certain message in order to be entitled to the
protections of the First Amendment," noting that the parade in Hurley
was not established to "espouse any views about sexual orientation."' 99
The Court in this case thus reinforced the holding of Hurley by
demonstrating that an organization may not be forced to communicate
a particular message, even when the organization does not exist
principally for the purpose of communicating its views on the topic.
In contrast to Dale, Roberts v. United States Jaycees provides
an example of a discriminatory policy with no clear connection to the
values or beliefs held by the group. 10 0 This case, like Dale, addressed
rights of association, but it also shed light on a few relevant principles
regarding free speech protection. In Jaycees, the Court reversed the
Eighth Circuit and concluded that the Minnesota Human Rights Act'01
required the Jaycees, an organization that was founded for young
men, to admit women as full voting members.10 2 Previously, women
could be "associated" (nonvoting) members, and in fact women made
up approximately two percent of the total membership.1 0 3 The lawsuit
arose when the president of the national organization threatened two
chapters in Minnesota with revocation of their charters, due to their
nearly decade-long practice of admitting women as regular, voting
members.10 4 In response, the chapters filed a complaint, alleging a
violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act, which prohibited,
among other things, discrimination on the basis of sex in places of
public accommodation. 105
Unlike in Dale and Hurley, where a contrary decision would
have forced the groups to communicate a message they did not want to
convey, 106 including women as full voting members would not inhibit
98. Id. at 650-51.
99. Id. at 655 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
101. Minnesota's public accommodation law forbids discrimination on the basis of sex in
places of public accommodation. MINN. STAT. § 363A.11, subdiv. 1 (2004); Jaycees, 468 U.S. at
615.
102. 468 U.S. at 612.
103. Id. at 612-13.
104. Id. at 614.
105. MINN. STAT. § 363A.03, subdiv. 34 (2004); Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 614-15.
106. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian
& Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995).
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the Jaycees's ability to express its views nor force it to communicate a
message with which it disagreed. 10 7 As the Court noted, the Jaycees
"promot[ed] the interests of young men."10 8 Including women would
not prohibit this mission; the Jaycees "already invites women to share
the group's views and philosophy and to participate in much of its
training and community activities." 10 9 Moreover, the Court's ruling did
nothing to restrict "the organization's ability to exclude individuals
with ideologies or philosophies different from those of its existing
members."1 1 0
Jaycees is also instructive in the way it reveals the effect of
broadly written public accommodation laws." 1 The Minnesota statute
defined "place of public accommodation" as "a business,
or
entertainment,
recreation,
accommodation,
refreshment,
transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations
are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the
public."1 12 The lower courts rejected the Jaycees's claim that the
organization was not a public accommodation and found that the Act
was "applicable to any public business facility."1 13 Of note is the
Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of "facility"; the court held
that the Jaycees met this requirement because the group "conducts its
11 4
activities at fixed and mobile sites within the State of Minnesota."
This finding was not disturbed by the Supreme Court in Jaycees;
however, sixteen years later in Dale, the Court criticized the
application of public accommodation laws when "place" was not tied to
a physical location. 11 5 Such a critique is relevant when evaluating
businesses that provide services without being linked to a particular
11 6
retail location.

107. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 627.
108. Id.
109. Id.

110. Id.
111. As discussed in Part III, broad definitions of "public accommodation" greatly expand
the reach of such statutes as compared to the traditional coverage for "places of public

amusement" or those providing "essential goods and services."
112. MINN. STAT. § 363A.03, subdiv. 34 (2004).
113. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 616 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 657 (2000). See generally Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609.
116. See infra Part III.
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3. The Inapplicability of O'Brien to Elane Photography and
Similar Cases
In United States v. O'Brien, the Court held that burning a draft
card combined "'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements" and stated that "a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms."1 1 7 The Court went on to note that any
government regulation must fulfill the following requirements: (1) the
regulation must "further an important or substantial governmental
interest;" (2) the governmental interest must be "unrelated to the
suppression of free expression;" and (3) "the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms [must be] no greater than is
1 18
essential to the furtherance of that interest."
The O'Brien test, however, is appropriate solely for "review of a
governmental regulation that has only an incidental effect on
protected speech."11 9 This limitation caused the Court to reject the
O'Brien test in Dale, stating that the public accommodations law
"directly and immediately affects ... associational rights that enjoy
First Amendment protection."' 120 Similarly, in Hurley, which was
decided more than twenty-five years after O'Brien, the Court found
O'Brien irrelevant to the case at hand. 12' Even Wooley, which referred
to O'Brien, nevertheless found a state's interest in "disseminat[ing] an
ideology" does not trump an individual's desire to "avoid becoming the
courier" for that message. Therefore, if the regulation directly compels
protected expression by an individual or business, O'Brien does not
apply.

II. PROTECTED ARTISTIC EXPRESSION, OR PROHIBITED
DISCRIMINATION?

A. A Snapshot of Elane Photography as It Develops
Elane Photography is co-owned by Jonathan and Elaine
Huguenin and is licensed to do business in New Mexico. 22 Elaine is
the head photographer and primarily photographs weddings, but she

117. 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
118. Id. at 377.
119. Dale, 530 U.S. at 659 (emphasis added).
120. Id.
121. See generally Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557
(1995) (failing to even mention O'Brien).
122. Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 48, at 3.
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also provides other services, including "[photos for] engagements,
individual and family portraits, and high-school graduation
pictures." 123 Far from a glorified one-dollar photo booth, Elaine is a
trained professional photographer who approaches her work with a
photojournalist style, which she considers both "artistic" and
"personally expressive." 124 When shooting a wedding, Elaine "takes
approximately sixteen hundred photos, searching for candid images
that best capture the story of the day," makes artistic and technical
modifications to the best three or four hundred photos, and then
makes those photos available for purchase by her clients.1 25 In
addition, Elaine commonly creates a coffee-table book that "illustrates
the wedding story through pictures."1 26 The pictures bear the
has
company's logo prior to purchase, and Elane Photography
1 27
purchase.
after
even
taken,
pictures
all
copyright ownership of
While Elane Photography offers the services described above, it
declines certain opportunities as well. For example, the company
turned down an invitation to photograph the production of a horror
movie, due to an unwillingness to "be associated with, or implicitly
promote" such works.1 28 The company's policy also "prohibits the use
of business resources to positively portray or otherwise endorse
abortion, pornography, nudity, or a marital union between anyone
other than one man and one woman, including polygamy or same-sex
'marriage.' "129 This last restriction proved costly in a way that Elaine
and Jonathan never anticipated.130
When Vanessa Willock discovered Elane Photography's website
in September 2006, she e-mailed to inquire about the possibility of
having the company provide its services for her and her partner's
same-sex commitment ceremony. 13 1 Because this would violate the
company's policy and force Jonathan and Elaine to "commemorate and
promote a message contrary to their sincerely held religious and moral
beliefs,"'132 Elaine politely declined to participate. 133 Near the end of
123. Id.
124. See id. at 4 (emphasis added).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 5.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 3.
129. Id. at 4.
130. Willock, HRD No. 06-12-20-0685 (N.M. Human Rights Comm'n Apr. 9, 2008) (final
order), available at http://www.telladf.orgIUserDocs/ElaneRuling.pdf (ruling against Elane
Photography); see also Potts, supra note 1, at 6.
131. Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 48, at 5-6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. Id. at 6.
133. Id. at 7.
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November, more than two months after the initial exchange, Willock
sent a second e-mail to Elane Photography, asking, "Are you saying
that your company does not offer your photography services to samesex couples?"'134 Elaine explained in her response that the company
"does not photograph same-sex weddings.' 3 5
After the commitment ceremony between Willock and her
partner (for which they hired a different photographer), Willock filed a
discrimination complaint with the Human Rights Commission of the
State of New Mexico ("Commission"), claiming that Elane
Photography violated New Mexico's public accommodation law, the
New Mexico Human Rights Act ("NMHRA"), by discriminating against
her because of her sexual orientation. 136 In April of 2008, the
Commission found that Elane Photography had violated the NMHRA
and ordered the company to pay $6,637.94 in attorney's fees and costs
to Vanessa Willock.137 Elane Photography appealed the order to the
Second Judicial District Court in New Mexico, but on December 11,
2009, the Court awarded summary judgment to Willock. 3 8 Elane
39
Photography is appealing the ruling.
B. FirstAmendment v. Anti-Discrimination:The Price Is Wrong
As evidenced by cases like Hurley, Wooley, Dale, and Jaycees,
the expanded scope of public accommodation laws makes conflict with
First Amendment rights of free speech a virtual certainty. 40 What
may initially seem less clear, however, is which interest should
prevail. By examining the New Mexico District Court's decision in
Elane Photography, this Note identifies the analysis that must occur
in such cases; although the district court held otherwise, Elane
Photography represents the prototypical situation in which the First
Amendment must triumph.
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. N.M. STAT. § 28-1-7(F) (2004); Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 48, at 8-9.
137. Willock, HRD No. 06-12-20-0685 (N.M. Human Rights Comm'n Apr. 9, 2008) (final
order), available at http://www.telladf.orgfUserDocs/ElaneRuling.pdf.
138. Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, No. CV-2008-06632,
22 (N.M. Jud. Dist. Ct.
Dec. 11, 2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/docd24425459/Elainte-Photography-LLC-vVanessa-Willock-N-M-2nd-Dist-2008-06632-Dec-11-2009.
139. Press Release, Alliance Def. Fund, ADF to Appeal Court Decision against NM
Photographer (Dec. 16, 2009), available at http://www.adfmedia.org/News/PRDetaiI/3595.
140. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 657 (2000) (stating such expansion has
"[increased] the potential for conflict"); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos.,
515 U.S. 557, 572-73 (1995) (noting possibility of First Amendment conflict); Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) (recognizing possible First Amendment conflict and
tensions).
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1. Public Accommodation Analysis
Under traditional state public accommodation laws, as well as
current federal law, an entity is not a public accommodation unless it
provides an "essential good or service" and falls within one of the
categories established by law.141 Current state laws, however, often
construe the phrase "public accommodation" more broadly. For
instance, the law at issue in Elane Photography expansively defines
or
public accommodation to include "any establishment that provides 142
public."
the
to
goods
or
accommodations
offers its services, facilities,
In order to effectively address clashes between the First Amendment
and public accommodation laws, courts must first agree on how to
interpret such laws.
a. When Is an Entity Correctly Deemed a
PublicAccommodation?
Even though state public accommodation laws have been
stretched broadly through the years,1 43 some courts have narrowed
their application by looking to history and early statutes in
determining whether a particular entity should be found to be a public
accommodation.1 44 For example, in Human Rights Commission of New
Mexico v. Board of Regents of University of New Mexico College of
Nursing, the New Mexico Supreme Court suggested that due to the
narrow history of public accommodation laws, a university should not
145
be considered a public accommodation unless mandated by statute.
Similarly, in Faulkner v. Solazzi, the Connecticut Supreme Court
noted that if it were to consider a barber shop a public
accommodation, it would effectively result in all services being public
accommodations, a conclusion the court maintained was clearly not
the intent of public accommodation laws. 146 Likewise, the Illinois
Supreme Court stated in Cecil v. Green that a statute requiring full
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006); Mass. Discrimination Act, 1865 Mass. Acts ch. 277
reprinted in MILTON KONVITZ, A CENTURY OF CIvIL RIGHTS 156 (1961); Lerman & Sanderson,
supranote 9, at 238.
142. N.M. STAT. § 28-1-2 (2004).
143. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 571-72 (providing brief history of how courts interpret public
accommodations provisions).
144. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M. Coll. of Nursing, 95
N.M. 576, 577-78 (1981) (finding a university was not a public accommodation and noting that
public accommodation laws arose from "common law duties of innkeepers and public carriers to
provide their services to the public without imposing unreasonable conditions" and did not
include universities).
145. See id. at 578.
146. 65 A. 947, 948-49 (Conn. 1907).
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and equal enjoyment of public accommodations did not apply to
business transactions by a drug store proprietor who sold soda, nor did
the law require physicians, lawyers, merchants, or farmers to do
147
business with anyone "unless of his own volition."
Other courts have more liberally interpreted public
accommodation laws. Sixty years after Connecticut determined that a
barber shop was not a public accommodation, the Supreme Court of
Washington issued a contrary ruling, finding that the statute at issue
was properly applied to a downtown barbershop that "render[ed] ...
personal services."' 148 In Crawford v. Robert L. Kent, Inc., the
Massachusetts high court determined that a dancing school fell within
149
the public accommodation law.
The district court in Elane Photography embraced the broader
view of public accommodations, concluding that an entity need not be
providing a traditional "essential service" to be a public
accommodation. 150 The court also rejected Elane Photography's
request that it consider the original NMHRA in making its decision,
which listed five types of public accommodations: "(1) hotels and other
places of lodging; (2) restaurants and other places where food or
beverages are served; (3) hospitals, clinics, and places for healthcare
or medicine; (4) places of entertainment; and (5) common carriers or
'15 1
other places of public transportation.
In addition to determining the types of entities generally
covered by public accommodation statutes, courts must decide
whether such laws apply to entities that do not occupy a physical
retail location. The Supreme Court has addressed this issue on more
than one occasion, though the results have not been wholly consistent.
In Jaycees, the Court faced the question of whether the organization
'
fell within the statute's application to "public business facilit[ies]. "152
Answering in the affirmative, the Court found that the Jaycees
conducted activities at "fixed and mobile sites" within the state. 153 The
Court further noted that the local chapters were "neither small nor

147. 43 N.E. 1105, 1106 (Ill.
1896).
148. In re Johnson, 427 P.2d 968, 973 (Wash. 1960).
149. 167 N.E.2d 620, 621 (Mass. 1960).
150. Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, No. CV-2008-06632, 1 8 (N.M. Jud. Dist. Ct.
Dec. 11, 2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/24425459/Elainte-Photography-LLC-vVanessa-Willock-N-M-2nd-Dist-2008-06632-Dec- 11-2009.
151. N.M. STAT. § 49-8-5 (1955); Elane Photography, No. CV-2008-06632, 1 7; Plaintiffs
Memorandum, supranote 48, at 11.
152. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 616 (1984).
153. Id. at 616, 625-26 (emphasis added).
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selective."'154 However, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Court
criticized the lower court for failing to connect "place" to an actual
location. 55 This stricter view of "place" seems consistent with the
Court's finding in Hurley, where it rejected the state court's attempt to
essentially "declare[] the sponsors' speech itself to be the [place of]
' 56
public accommodation."'
This question arose in Elane Photography,and the court relied
on Jaycees in finding that the company was a place of public
accommodation. 157 Rejecting the plaintiffs claim that the NMHRA is
limited by its terms to only "establishments," which is defined to be "a
place of business or residence with its furnishings and staff,"' 5 8 the
court pointed to the Internet and its effect on commercial activity as
59
support for its finding that a physical location was not essential.
Determining what entities are correctly deemed public
accommodations is much more than an academic exercise; the
implications are significant. A narrow view exempts businesses
supplying expressive services, such as Elane Photography, from the
application of public accommodation laws. In contrast, a broad view
expands the original purpose of public accommodation laws,
essentially substituting "place of business" for "place of public
accommodation."' 60 The approach taken by courts in regard to the
question of whether an entity is a place of public accommodation will
often be outcome determinative. As such, it is imperative that public
accommodation laws are interpreted consistently.
b. When Is the PublicAccommodation Law
Actually Violated?
Just as courts must carefully determine whether an entity falls
within the statutory definition of a public accommodation, they also
must take care to not gloss over the question of whether the law has
154. Id. at 621.
155. 530 U.S. 640, 657 (2000).
156. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995).
157. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 625-26; Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, No. CV-200806632, 11 10-12 (N.M. Jud. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/
doc/24425459/Elainte-Photography-LLC-v-Vanessa-Wilock-N-M-2nd-Dist-2008-06632-Dec-1 12009.
10-12 (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER
158. Elane Photography, No. CV-2008-06632,
ONLINE DICTIONARY, http:I/www.m-w.con/dictionarylestablishment); see also N.M. STAT. § 28-12(H) (2004).

159. Elane Photography,No. CV-2008-06632, 12.
160. See supra notes 15-32 and accompanying text; see also supra note 143 and
accompanying text regarding Faulkner (discussing the drawbacks to a broad interpretation of
"public accommodations").
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actually been violated. Public accommodation laws prohibit
161
discrimination based on improper grounds such as race or religion.
While this might appear to be a simple determination to make, Elane
Photographyillustrates that the inquiry can be complicated.
In Elane Photography,the company contended that its decision
to decline the defendant's request was not because of her sexual
orientation, but because the company refuses to photograph any
alternative marriage ceremonies. 162 Elane Photography cited the
proposition that in such cases, it must be shown "that the [business]
intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of her ['sexual
orientation']. '"163 The district court dismissed this argument, stating
that Elane Photography "has an existing policy that excludes samesex couples from its wedding photography services."'164 While at first
glance the policy operates just as the court contended, a closer look
reveals it does not prohibit photography services for gay or lesbian
individuals. Rather, it prohibits the company from "positively
portray[ing]... a marital union between anyone other than one man
or one woman."'165 This means that, according to its policy, Elane
Photography would take senior pictures for a gay high school student,
for example. It even means that Elane Photography would agree to
photograph a traditional wedding between a lesbian woman and gay
man, and would refuse to photograph a same-sex commitment
ceremony between two straight men. 166 Indeed, Elane Photography
maintains that it would have willingly provided other photography
services to the defendant, and refused the commitment ceremony
simply "because of the message conveyed by that event."' 67 According
to the Tenth Circuit, if evidence can "plausibly be interpreted two
different ways--one discriminatory and the other benign," there is no
168
direct evidence of discrimination.
161. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006).
162. Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 48, at 14-15.
163. Sonntag v. Shaw, 130 N.M. 238, 243 (2001), cited in Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra
note 48, at 15.
164. Elane Photography,No. CV-2008-06632, 18.
165. Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 48, at 4.
166. "Self-identified homosexuals do in fact marry persons of the opposite sex." Plaintiffs
Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment at 4 n.2,
Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, No. D-202-CV-200806632 (N.M. Jud. Dist. Ct. Sept. 22,
2009) [hereinafter Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum] (on file with author) (citing GARY J. GATES ET
AL., THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, MARRIAGE, REGISTRATION, AND DISSOLUTION BY SAME-SEX
COUPLES IN THE U.S. 10 (2008), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5tg8l47x#page-1).

167. Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 48, at 18.
168. Hall v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Admin. Review Bd., 476 F.3d 847, 855 (10th Cir. 2007).
While this Note does not address discrimination under Title VII, the test described in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green is arguably applicable to discrimination by public accommodations. In
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One can readily imagine other situations that would create
similar uncertainty regarding a business's motivation. Michael, the
liberal filmmaker described in the Introduction, might allege his
refusal to produce a political advertisement for a conservative
candidate was not based on the political ideology of the candidate, but
rather due to Michael's decision not to portray excessive gasoline
consumption as desirable, whether endorsed by liberal or conservative
candidates. Such a scenario underscores the importance of a
consistent approach in determining the scope and reach of public
accommodation laws.
2. First Amendment Analysis
While Hurley demonstrates that public accommodation laws do
not nullify First Amendment protection, it is necessary to determine
whether the First Amendment in fact applies to the particular
situation. The following considerations are relevant to answering this
critical question.
a. Is the Activity Sufficiently Expressive?
When an entity claims a First Amendment defense in response
to a charge of discrimination by a public accommodation, the court
must determine whether the alleged expression is protected. As Chief
Justice Rehnquist opined in City of Dallas v. Stanglin, "It is possible
to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person
undertakes.., but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity
within the protection of the First Amendment."' 169 Therefore, the court
should first apply Texas v. Johnson and determine whether " 'an
intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether]
Title VII cases, a plaintiff is able to use direct or indirect evidence to show discriminatory intent.
Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998). Direct evidence, which is
rarely used to establish discriminatory intent, requires no inference or presumption. Standard,
161 F.3d at 1330; see also Robinson v. Runyon, 149 F.3d 507, 513 (6th Cir. 1998) ("Rarely will
there be direct evidence from the lips of the defendant proclaiming his or her [discriminatory]
animus."). If direct evidence is produced, a defendant can avoid liability "'only by proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not
taken the [illegitimate criterion] into account.'" Evans v. McClain of Ga., Inc., 131 F.3d 957, 962
(quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989)). If direct evidence is not
available, and indirect evidence is offered, the court implements the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green framework. Standard, 161 F.3d at 1331 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973)). In short, once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the
defendant must offer a 'legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" to rebut a presumption of
discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The burden then returns to the plaintiff to
show that the reason provided was a pretext. Id. at 807.
169. 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
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the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by
those who viewed it.' "170 If not, the First Amendment does not apply,
171
and the defense fails.
In cases such as Elane Photography, it should be relatively
172
simple to determine that the entity engages in expressive activity.
As discussed above, First Amendment protection may be extended to
pictures. 173 Kaplan v. California and Bery v. City of New York provide
strong evidence that "expression means more than the spoken
word."'1 74 Thus, pictures of a same-sex commitment ceremony could
easily be understood to communicate a message of approval or
celebration for that ceremony, or, at the very least, recognition.
While the facts of Elane Photography are unique, courts have
considered this question in other cases pitting the First Amendment
against public accommodation laws. In Ocean Grove Camp Meeting
Association v. Vespa-Papaleo, a religious organization filed suit
against New Jersey officials in response to an investigation the state
launched after the organization "refused to allow a same-sex civil
union ceremony at one of its worship facilities."'175 The ministry
alleged that its free speech rights were violated, in addition to its
rights of expressive association and free exercise. 176 In a hearing, the

170. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (alteration in original) (citing Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)).
171. See id. (noting that the conduct must "possess[ ] sufficient communicative elements to
bring the First Amendment into play").
172. See supranotes 47-54 and accompanying text.
173. Supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
174. Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, No. CV-2008-06632,
19 (N.M. Jud. Dist. Ct.
Dec. 11, 2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/dod/24425459/Elainte-Photography-LLC-vVanessa-Willock-N-M-2nd-Dist-2008-06632-Dec-11-2009 (citing Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S.
115, 119 (1973) ('The Court has applied. .. First Amendment standards to moving pictures, to
photographs, and to words in books.")); see Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 696 (2d Cir.
1996) ("[Plaintings, photographs, prints and sculptures, such as those appellants seek to display
and sell in public areas of the City, always communicate some idea or concept to those who view
it, and as such are entitled to full First Amendment protection." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
175. Press Release, Alliance Def. Fund, N.J. Ministry Sues to Prevent State from Forcing
Church to Violate its Religious Beliefs (Aug. 13, 2007), available at http://www.adfmedia.
orgJNews/PRDetail2034?search=1.
176. Complaint
37, 42, 48, Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n of the United Methodist
Church v. Vespa-Papaleo, No. 3:33-av-00001 (D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2007), available at
http://www.teadf.orgUserDocs/OceanGroveComplaint.pdf. Though Ocean Grove raised a free
association claim in addition to its "expressive" claims, the Supreme Court held in Employment
Division v. Smith, that "the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation
to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability." 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Essentially, this ruling greatly reduced
free exercise protection under the First Amendment by requiring only rational basis review for "a
neutral law of general applicability" but strict scrutiny for laws "directed at religious practices."
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State of New Jersey Division on Civil Rights found that "[p]robable
[clause exists to credit the allegations of the complaint. 177 The
Division held that "a civil union ceremony before invited guests ...
conveys no message and is not expressive association."'178 Applying the
Johnson test, it seems curious to argue that conducting a civil union
ceremony in front of invited guests did not have a purpose of
communicating any type of message, and illogical to suggest the
guests would not understand the message communicated. Moreover,
the ongoing debate among U.S. churches regarding homosexuals and
gay "marriage"' 79 only strengthens the argument that such a
ceremony is expressive activity. Once again, this question is an
important one, as whether or not expression is involved in cases like
Elane Photography and Ocean Grove will often be outcome
determinative.
Other situations that would generate controversy regarding
whether an activity is sufficiently expressive are easy to imagine. For
example, should First Amendment protection extend to a Mormon
contractor who refuses a request to build the new headquarters for
Lambda Legal, or a homosexual contractor who refuses a request to
build the new headquarters for the Christian ministry Focus on the
Family? Is a coffee shop owner engaging in expressive activity when
he selects musical acts to perform at his establishment? Such
hypothetical scenarios demonstrate the complexity of the issue, and
further demand a clear answer.
b. Was the Entity Compelled to Speak?
The mere presence of expressive activity does not end the
inquiry. The court must next determine whether the statute operated
in such a way as to compel the expression. In Hurley, while finding the
statute did not, "on its face, target speech or discriminate on the basis
of its content," the Supreme Court nonetheless found that, as applied,
the law forced the parade organizers to communicate a message they
18 0
did not approve.

177. Finding of Probable Cause at 12, Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n, No.
PN34XB-03008 (N.J. Div. on Civil Rights Dec. 29, 2008), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag
/newsreleasesO8pr20081229a-Bernstein-v-OGCMA.pdf.
178. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
179. See, e.g., Eric Gorski, Evangelical Church Opens Doors Fully to Gays, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Dec. 19, 2009, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34493087/ns/us-news-faithl
(discussing the divide within the mainline Protestant and Evangelical churches regarding
homosexuality).
180. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 572-73 (1995).
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In applying Hurley to Elane Photography,one may argue-and
indeed, the district court held-that Elane Photography's message had
never been about same-sex marriage. 18 1 Therefore, forcing Elaine to
create photographs commemorating a ceremony and message with
which she personally disagrees does not constitute compelled
speech. 182 However, such a holding directly conflicts with Hurley,
where the parade in question was not established to "espouse any
views about sexual orientation."'1 3 This lack of a central message
involving sexual orientation was insignificant. As the Court noted,
"[I]t boils down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular
point of view, and that choice is presumed to lie beyond the
84
government's power to control."'
Another potentially relevant case in a court's analysis of
whether speech was compelled is Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights, Inc.185 In Rumsfeld, the Court held that the
Solomon Amendment did not compel speech by requiring institutes of
higher education to give military recruiters the same access to the
school as nonmilitary recruiters or forfeit federal funding.186 However,
a key element in Rumsfeld is that schools had a choice to continue
their educational mission without interference by simply forfeiting
88
federal funding18 7-a solution that several schools implemented.
This distinction is relevant in a case like Elane Photography,where an
entity is placed in the unenviable position of either forfeiting its
discretion or leaving a particular field of business entirely. A more
appropriate case to analogize to such situations may be Wooley v.
25 (N.M. Jud. Dist. Ct.
181. Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, No. CV-2008-06632,
Dec. 11, 2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/24425459/Elainte-Photography-LLC-vVanessa-Willock-N-M-2nd-Dist-2008-06632-Dec-11-2009.
182. See id.
183. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655 (2000) (discussing Hurley).
184. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575.
23 (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic
185. Elane Photography, No. CV-2008-06632,
& Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006)). This case may seem to be a surprising choice
considering the widespread criticism this decision has prompted in academic circles. See, e.g.,
Protest and Amelioration, SOLOMONRESPONSE.ORG, http://www.law.georgetown.edulsolomon
/smaterials.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2011) (referring to Rumsfeld as a "veritable invitation to
law schools to protest the Solomon Amendment).
186. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 52, 64.
187. Id. at 56.
188. Neither Hillsdale College nor Grove City College accepts federal funds. David
Bernstein, Very Much PrecedentedTying of Federal Aid to Colleges to Obeying Government Rules,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 29, 2005 7:09 PM), http://volokh.com/posts/l1133312972.shtml. Also,
Vermont Law School and William Mitchell College of Law have declined federal funds, allowing
them to ban military recruiters from campus. Katie Zezima, Law School Pays the Price in 'Don't
Ask' Rule Protest, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2008, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2008/06/29/education/29vermont.html?_r= l.
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Maynard, where state law forced motorists to display the state motto
on their plates, or effectively forfeit the ability to drive.1 8 9 There, the
Court found that the state could not require the plaintiff to display the
state motto. 190
c. Is the Entity Simply a Conduit for
Its Clients' Speech?
While Hurley and Wooley, taken alone, demonstrate that public
accommodation laws may not force an entity to communicate a
message with which it disagrees, the court's inquiry is not finished.
When a speaker is merely a "conduit" for others' messages, the
Supreme Court says there is "little risk" that others will assume the
speaker is endorsing those messages. 191 In such cases, the First
Amendment provides less protection. 92 This is perhaps the most
appealing argument against providing full First Amendment
protection to businesses accused of violating public accommodation
laws, but as explained below, this93principle has limited applicability to
entities like Elane Photography.1
The central case on this issue is Turner BroadcastingSystem,
Inc. v. FCC, in which the Supreme Court applied intermediate
scrutiny to cable must-carry provisions that were "content-neutral"
and imposed only an "incidental burden on speech" by the cable
operators. 94 In Turner, the cable providers simply selected the
programming sources and then transmitted the material provided on
a "continuous and unedited basis," exercising "no conscious control
over program services provided by others."'195
Turner is easily distinguished from Elane Photography. Elane
Photography operates in sharp contrast to how the cable providers
operated in Turner, exercising artistic discretion, selecting the
appropriate moments to capture on film, and then consciously and
See 430 U.S. 705, 707 (1977) (considering whether New Hampshire could enforce
sanctions on persons who cover the motto "Live Free or Die" on their license plate).
Id. at 717.
See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661-62 (1994).
Id. at 655-56.
25 (N.M. Jud. Dist.
193. See Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, No. CV-2008-06632,
Ct. Dec. 11, 2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/24425459/Elainte-Photography-LLC-vVanessa-Willock-N-M-2nd-Dist-2008-06632-Dec-11-2009 ("Plaintiff is conveying its client's
message of a day well spent.").
194. Turner, 512 U.S. at 661-62. 'Must-carry provisions" refer to the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act's requirement that cable companies "devote a portion
of their channels to the transmission of local broadcast television stations." Id. at 626.
195. Id. at 629 (quoting Daniel Brenner, Cable Television and the Freedom of Expression,
1988 DuKE L.J. 329, 339 (1988)).
189.
criminal
190.
191.
192.
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stylistically editing those moments to create a finished product that
tells a story from the photographer's perspective. 196 Because of this
high level of involvement in the creation of the expression at issue,
Elane Photography is not simply a conduit of another party's speech.
Turner would also be inapplicable to Michael, the liberal filmmaker
described in the Introduction, as he takes an active role in capturing,
editing and displaying a candidate's message in a political
advertisement.
Turner is most relevant to those situations in which an entity
provides a service to its clients without any control over the content of
their speech. For example, a company that provided translation
services for clients would simply be serving as a conduit for the clients'
speech. Not coincidentally, such a company may also struggle to
demonstrate that its service is sufficiently expressive to warrant First
Amendment protection. This again demonstrates the need for clarity
not only in defining the scope of public accommodation laws, but also
in determining what constitutes expressive activity.
d. May the Entity Easily Disclaim the
Message of Its Speech?
Whether the speaker may disclaim the message being
communicated also bears on whether an entity has been compelled to
speak. 19 7 The Hurley Court distinguished Turner, noting that in a
parade, "there is no customary practice whereby private sponsors
disavow any identity of viewpoint between themselves and the
selected participants.' 198 In contrast, the Turner Court observed that
cable has a "long history of serving as a conduit for broadcast signals,"
and thus there is "little risk" that viewers will attribute particular
station messages to the operator. 199 Moreover, network operators
benefit from the added safeguard of issuing routine disclaimers. As
the Court in Turner stated, "[I]t is a common practice for broadcasters
to disclaim any identity of viewpoint between the management and
the speakers who use the broadcast facility. '20 0 Similarly, in
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, the Court explained that a

196. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 57576 (1995).
198. Id. at 576 (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. Thrner,512 U.S. at 655.
200. Id. (citing PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980)).
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any
shopping center owner could easily post signs to 20disclaim
1
connection with messages from speakers or handbillers.
Elane Photographyis factually distinct from the cable company
in Turner and the shopping center in PruneYard. Photos taken,
edited, and copyrighted by the plaintiff, and bearing the company's
watermark when displayed on the website, 20 2 are unlikely to be
viewed as abstractly as a cable company's offerings or handbills in a
shopping center. Of course, even the Court's assumption regarding
broadcasters may not hold true in practice, as past events such as the
infamous Janet Jackson Super Bowl halftime show debacle
demonstrate. 2 3 Elane Photography would find it even more difficult to
distance itself from the message, short of posting a disclaimer on its
website, or printing a disclaimer on the photos themselves. The first
alternative would be ineffective when the printed photographs are
displayed or viewed apart from the website, and the second "solution"
can hardly be expected to be embraced by either party. The liberal
filmmaker described in the Introduction could face similar difficulties
in disclaiming the message communicated through his work. Turner's
limitation on First Amendment protection may be relevant, however,
to a coffee shop owner who welcomes poets or musicians to present
their work during an "open mic night."
3. A Spectrum of Expressive Activity
Although the New Mexico district court found otherwise, Elane
Photography is an example of a business engaged in expressive
activity. 20 4 On the other end of the spectrum are cases that illustrate
the prototypical public accommodation situation, such as Lombard v.
Louisiana.20 5 In Lombard, cited in Hurley, the Supreme Court
reversed the trespass convictions of four college students-three black
and one white-who were arrested for their refusal to leave a
refreshment counter that served only whites. 20 6 The Court held that,
since the restaurant was a place of public accommodation, it was-like

201. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87.
202. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
203. FCC Launches Probe into Super Bowl Halftime Show, FIRST AMENDMENT CTR. (Feb. 2,
2004) (discussing liability CBS could face for broadcasting the Janet Jackson "wardrobe
2
malfunction"), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.orglnews.aspx?id=1 558.
text.
accompanying
120-24
and
supra
notes
204. See
205. 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
206. Id. at 268-69 (noting that the white petitioner was likely asked to leave because he was
"in the company of Negroes").
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amusement-an
of
public
and
places
inns,
railroads,
20 7
State."
the
of
"instrumentalit[y]
Lombard and cases like it differ from the facts in Elane
Photography in a critical respect: the store's business activity did not
entail expressive conduct, and thus presented no compelled-speech
issue. 20 Between Elane Photography and Lombard are a variety of
situations in which a business, though arguably engaging in
nonexpressive activity, nonetheless enhances or makes possible the
expression of its customer.
Bono Film and Video, Inc. v. Arlington County Human Rights
Commission is one such case. 20 9 In 2005, Tim Bono, President of Bono
Film and Video, Inc., received a request from Lilli Vincenz to make
video duplicates of betacams entitled "Second Largest Minority" and
"Gay and Proud. '210 When Bono refused, stating that the betacams
"involved the gay agenda," Vincenz filed a complaint with the
Arlington County Human Rights Commission, stating that "Bono Film
had discriminated against her on the basis of her sexual orientation"
in violation of the county's public accommodation law.2 11 The
commission later dismissed the case because the underlying
legislation failed to include "sexual orientation" among its "prohibited
' 212
categories of discrimination."
If the case had moved forward, and Bono had raised the same
objection made by Elane Photography-that he was not refusing to
serve a lesbian, he was refusing to help promote a message advocating
a "homosexual agenda" and would gladly make copies of other
materials for Ms. Vincenz-would a court apply Hurley and find the
public accommodation law was "compel[ling] affirmance of a belief
with which the speaker disagrees"? 213 Or, consider a different context:
should an atheist contractor who believes that organized religion is
dangerous to society and denigrates women be able to refuse a
contract to build a megachurch, when he would willingly provide
another service to the pastor, such as building his house? The
difficulty of such questions highlights the continued need for clarity

207. Id. at 281 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 58-59
(1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
208. See generally id. (involving a privately owned restaurant facility).
209. 72 Va. Cir. 256, 257 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2006).
210. Id.
211. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
212. Id. at 258-59.
213. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995)
(citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
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and consistency in resolving the conflict between public
accommodation laws and First Amendment rights.
Similar situations could arise in a variety of contexts, as many
private businesses involve elements of expressive activity: consider a
freelance writer, an artist, or a web designer. Failure to make a clear
distinction between the refusal to endorse a message and the refusal
to provide a nonexpressive service deals a severe blow to First
Amendment freedom. Further, automatically holding such businesses
to be public accommodations-and prohibiting some messages while
compelling others-is turning a blind eye to the reality of how these
entities carry on business. It is simply not a workable solution.
C. Focusing: The AppropriateLevel of Scrutiny
After a court has determined that (1) a business is engaging in
expressive activity protected by the First Amendment and (2) a public
accommodation law is being applied in such a way as to diminish or
prohibit that activity, it must determine which interest outweighs the
other. To do so, it must first determine the appropriate level of
scrutiny. 214 As a general rule, strict scrutiny is appropriate for laws
that "suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon
speech because of its content," or that compel speech, while those that
are "unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate
215
level of scrutiny."
1. Strict Scrutiny
The Supreme Court applies "the most exacting scrutiny to
regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential
burdens upon speech because of its content," as well as to those laws
which "compel speakers to utter or distribute speech bearing a
particular message." 216 When subject to strict scrutiny, restrictions on
speech must be "narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest" for a
court to uphold them as constitutional. 21 7 The Court has held that this
is an "exacting" test and requires a "pressing public necessity" and
''essential value," which must still "restrict as little speech as
possible." 218 Jaycees indicated that the government in that case had a
compelling interest in reducing acts of discrimination against women,
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 680 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
Id.
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2 19
which was sufficient to "justif[y] the... application of the statute."
However, as discussed in Part I.C.2, the restriction in Jaycees did not
actually restrict the group's speech or compel it to proclaim a message
with which it disagreed. 220 Because the application of the public
accommodation law failed to restrict the group's expression, this case
would have been more appropriately analyzed under intermediate
221
scrutiny.
In contrast to Jaycees, both Hurley and Dale invalidated the
application of laws that would force the groups to communicate a
message they did not want to convey. 222 Of these three cases, Hurley is
far more relevant-and is in fact determinative-in regard to
restrictions on expressive activity, as both Jaycees and Dale dealt
primarily with rights of expressive association.223 In Hurley, the state
presumably had the same interest as New Mexico in Elane
Photography-eliminating discriminatory biases. 24 However, the
Court swiftly declared this rationale was insufficient when
225
"[r]equiring access to a speaker's message" is a means to this end.
The Court stated:
The very idea that a noncommercial speech restriction be used to produce thoughts and
statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all people, grates on the First
Amendment, for it amounts to nothing less than a proposal to limit speech2 in
the service
26
of orthodox expression. The Speech Clause has no more certain antithesis.

For these reasons, and the "Nation's commitment to protect freedom of
speech," the Hurley Court found that the state failed to satisfy the
compelling interest requirement. 227 As the Supreme Court has said

219. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
220. Id. at 627.
221. See infra notes 229-37 and accompanying text.
222. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 643 (2000); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian
& Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 559 (1995).
223. Compare Hurley, 515 U.S. at 578-79, with Dale, 530 U.S. at 647-48, and Jaycees, 468
U.S. at 622-23.
224. Compare Hurley, 515 U.S. at 578 (saying it could be argued that "the ultimate point of
forbidding acts of discrimination toward certain classes is to produce a society free of the
corresponding biases'), with Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, No. CV-2008-06632,
22
(N.M. Jud. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/24425459/ElaintePhotography-LLC-v-Vanessa-WiUock-N-M-2nd-Dist-2008-06632-Dec-11-2009
(holding
that
nondiscrimination laws prohibit "the act of discriminating against individuals") (quoting Hurley,
515 U.S. at 572).
225. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 578-79.
226. Id. at 579.
227. Id. at 581.
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elsewhere, such regulations "cannot be tolerated under the First
228
Amendment."
2. Intermediate Scrutiny
Intermediate

scrutiny

applies

to

"regulations

that

are

unrelated to the content of speech."229 When this standard of review is

applied to a content-neutral regulation, the regulation "need not be
the least speech-restrictive means of advancing the Government's
interests," and instead only needs to promote a " 'substantial
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation.' "230 Expressed differently, this requires that three prongs
be met:
(1) the government must have had the actual purpose of suppressing secondary effects
when it enacted the ordinance;

(2) the entity must have had a reasonable evidentiary basis for concluding that its
regulation would have the desired effect, which requires that the entity show that the
evidence upon which it relied was reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that
the entity sought to address; and
(3) the ordinance must leave the quantity and accessibility of speech substantially
231
intact.

Turner suggests that the way to determine whether the law is
content neutral is to determine "whether the government has adopted
a regulation of speech because of [agreement or] disagreement with
the message it conveys. ' 232 This was an easy determination for the
Court in Turner, as the must-carry provision focused on the
preservation of free television programming rather than on any
233
particular subject matter.
The question calls for a different answer in Elane Photography,
however, where the law has the effect of forcing the plaintiff to
communicate at least recognition and acceptance, if not endorsement,
of same-sex ceremonies. Moreover, adding sexual orientation as a
protected class in public accommodation laws-as some states have
done 234-is
akin to agreeing with the message of same-sex

228. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116
(1991) (citing Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984)).
229. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
230. Id. at 662 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
231. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 480 (2010) (citing 729, Inc. v. Kenton Cnty.
Fiscal Court, 515 F.3d 485 (6th Cir. 2008)).
232. 512 U.S. at 642 (citations omitted).
233. Id. at 646.
234. See, e.g., supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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commitment ceremonies, or at the very least disagreeing with any
message that disapproves of such ceremonies. While this is a nuanced
distinction, another statement by the Turner Court sheds light on the
proper conclusion:
At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide
for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and
adherence. Our political system and cultural life rest upon this ideal. Government
action that stifles speech on account of its message, or that requires the utterance of a
235
particular message favored by the Government, contravenes this essential right.

Moreover, the principle set forth in Hurley makes it clear that
when a public accommodation law is applied in a manner that limits
or compels speech, it is in fact a speech restriction, and therefore must
satisfy strict scrutiny.236 The situation presented in Elane
Photography more closely resembles Hurley than Jaycees in this
23 7
regard.
The application of the Hurley principle to cases like Elane
Photograpy is clear-because strict scrutiny requires laws limiting
speech to be narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest,
businesses will be more likely to prevail in a First Amendment
challenge if strict scrutiny is applied. The likelihood of different
outcomes depending on the level of scrutiny employed illustrates the
importance of this stage of the analysis, and the need for clear
direction.

III. SOLUTION: FRAMING THE PICTURE
Hurley provides the necessary framework to evaluate cases like
Elane Photography, recognizing that First Amendment rights to
freedom of speech must not take a backseat to public accommodation
laws. 238 However, the district court's decision in Elane Photography,as
well as other situations described above, highlights the need for
greater clarity and consistency. 239 There are steps that both
legislatures and courts can take to achieve this clarity. First, the
legislature should draft public accommodation laws more narrowly in
regard to the places defined as public accommodations, as well as the

235. Id. at 641 (citations omitted).
236. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 578-79
(1995); see also Turner, 512 U.S. at 641-42.
237. Compare Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627 (1984), with Hurley, 515 U.S. at
559-61, and Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 48, at 23.
238. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572-73.
239. Other situations include the filmmaker described in the Introduction, the Bono case,
and the atheist contractor described in Part H.B.3.
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groups defined as protected classes. Second, courts should construe
such statutes narrowly when determining whether the law has been
violated, follow the principles set forth in Hurley, and protect First
Amendment rights when public accommodation laws are applied in a
way that compel--or restrict-speech.
A. Legislative Changes
The first, and easiest, way to address the clash between public
accommodation laws and the First Amendment right of free speech is
to avoid it altogether. By drafting public accommodation laws
narrowly in light of the original purpose and scope of such laws, 240 the
legislature will enable the judicial system to avoid many of the more
troublesome conflicts it would otherwise face. This requires not only a
more narrow understanding of what types of businesses are public
accommodations, 241 but also what groups should be covered by these
242
laws as a protected class.
As discussed above, the more broadly that public
accommodation laws are written, the greater "the potential for conflict
between state public accommodations laws and the First Amendment
rights of organizations." 243 Therefore, it is important that legislatures
look to the historical purpose of public accommodation laws as they
draft and refine such laws. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides an
excellent example of the types of establishments that should be
covered. 244 Carefully setting the parameters would avoid many of the
problematic examples discussed earlier by confining these laws to
establishments that provide nonexpressive, nondiscretionary services
to the public at large.
Although this first step, if taken, would be most effective in
eliminating unnecessary conflict with the First Amendment, the
legislature should also rein in the expansion of those groups labeled a
protected class. As the Court noted in Jaycees, public accommodation
laws "provide[] the primary means for protecting the civil rights of
historically disadvantaged groups." 245 This, of course, is why early

240. See supra notes 7-32 and accompanying text.
241. Compare Mass. Discrimination Act, 1865 Mass. Acts ch. 277 reprinted in MILTON
KONviTz, A CENTURY OF CmL RIGHTS 156 (1961), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5 (West Supp.

2010).
242.
243.
244.
245.

Compare Mass. Discrimination Act, with D.C. CODE § 2-1402.31 (2001).
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 657 (2000).
See supranotes 18-22 and accompanying text.
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984) (emphasis added).
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laws focused narrowly on race discrimination. 246 When these laws are
rewritten to include marital status, personal appearance, sexual
orientation, political affiliation, and other criteria, they not only move
outside the realm of historically disadvantaged groups, but also serve
to remove a certain measure of discretion which private businesses
have long been held to possess. 247 While the question of precisely
which groups should be considered a "protected class" is, to a large
extent, outside the scope of this Note, it is important to recognize that
expanding the reach of the term "protected class" necessarily reduces
the amount of protection received by historically protected groups. 248
The current expansion of public accommodation laws is
problematic in another way when applied to cases like Elane
Photography. By placing particular sexual behaviors under the
protection of public accommodation laws, the government is takingand enforcing-a position that the behavior at issue is, if not morally
right, at least morally neutral. 249 This is evidenced by the simple fact
that there are few, if any, laws protecting pedophiles, bigamists, or
other such groups from discrimination. 25 0 Such a stance, implicit or
otherwise, has significant implications for cases like Elane
Photography. If the government is viewed as communicating that a
behavior is at least morally neutral, if not beneficial, by a group's
designation as a protected class, it is reasonable for a photographer to
claim that being forced to photograph a same-sex commitment
ceremony requires an admission of the same. Such a situation is what
the Court spoke against in Dale when it stated that "this [changing
perception of homosexuality] is scarcely an argument for denying First
Amendment protection to those who refuse to accept these views." 251
Regardless of the government's view-or society's view-of a

246. See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
247. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (upholding the 'long
recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal").
248. If a public accommodation law prohibits discrimination based on hair color as well as
discrimination based on race, a court must either evaluate the protection due each group on a
sliding scale based on the judge's personal hierarchy, or set the level of protection to the lowest
common denominator. The first is unworkable, and the second cheapens protection for those
groups that most need it.
249. See Feldblum, supra note 43, at 85 ("My argument is simply that when government
decides, through the enactment of its laws, that a certain way of life does not harm those living
that life and does not harm others exposed to such individuals, the government is necessarily
staking out a position of moral neutrality with regard to that way of living.').
250. See id. at 86.
251. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 660 (2000).
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particular message, the First Amendment "protects expression, be it of
'252
the popular variety or not.
B. Changes in the Courts
Because of the broad scope of many current state public
accommodation laws, some conflict with the First Amendment is
inevitable. 253 Following the canon of constitutional avoidance, courts
should construe these statutes in a way that avoids "constitutional
problems" if possible. 2 54 One might argue that this could be
accomplished by simply denying that the effect on speech was
sufficient to violate the First Amendment. 255 Such an assumption,
however, fails to avoid the question. Rather, it summarily-and
prematurely-dispatches an important constitutional issue at the
expense of First Amendment freedom. This is an incorrect application
of the doctrine. If conflict can be avoided, it is more appropriate to do
so by finding that the entity's expressive activity was not a public
accommodation. This would avoid the constitutional problem while
protecting constitutional rights.
The following four considerations will also enable courts to
more consistently determine when public accommodation laws must
accommodate the First Amendment.
1. When "Discrimination" Is Simply a Refusal to
Endorse a Message
First, courts must more clearly evaluate when public
accommodation laws have actually been violated, as opposed to when
the individual or business is simply refusing to endorse a particular
message. 256 The circumstances in which a business is alleging a
violation of its free speech rights should be particularly relevant in
determining whether the public accommodation law is being used to
regulate conduct or speech. Specifically, if the business in question
would willingly provide a service to the complaining party that is not
associated with an expressive message, courts should be hesitant to
252. Id.
253. See id. at 657 (noting that "the potential for conflict between state public
accommodations laws and the First Amendment rights of organizations has increased" as the
definition of "public accommodation" has broadened).
254. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
255. See, e.g., Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, No. CV-2008-06632, 22 (N.M. Jud.
Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/24425459/Elainte-PhotographyLLC-v-Vanessa-Willock-N-M-2nd-Dist-2008-06632-Dec-11-2009.
256. See infra Part HI.B.l.b.
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find a violation of the statute. For instance, a freelance designer may
be more than happy to produce a brochure promoting the caf6 run by a
lesbian (or a conservative, pro-gun advocate), but be unwilling to
produce a brochure for an organization in which the lesbian (or
conservative, pro-gun advocate) serves on the board, when the
organization is an advocacy group for the legalization of same-sex
marriage (or the legalization of personal possession of automatic
weapons). Such a decision is clearly not based on discrimination
against the individual, but is rather a refusal to endorse a particular
message. And while Hurley provides the necessary framework for
courts to make these important distinctions, Elane Photography
257
demonstrates the unwillingness of some courts to do so.
2. Measuring the Expressiveness
Second, courts must consistently apply the standard the
Supreme Court has established for what constitutes expressive
activity protected by the First Amendment. To determine whether
conduct is sufficiently expressive to invoke the First Amendment,
courts should apply the Johnson test and ask (1) whether "an intent to
convey a particularized message was present" and (2) "whether the
likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those
who viewed it."258
259
While not all cases provide a clear answer to this question,
courts should err on the side of protecting expression. In Johnson,
Justice Brennan emphasized the First Amendment's role in protecting
unpopular expression: "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the
First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable." 260 Because this can be a difficult
determination to make, it further highlights the need for the
legislature to more narrowly and more accurately define public
accommodations and protected classes in order to avoid some of these
unnecessary conflicts.

257. Compare Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 572
), with Elane
(1995) ("Petitioners disclaim any intent to exclude homosexuals as such.
Photography,No. CV-2008-06632, 1 18.
258. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S.
405, 409-10 (1974)); see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
259. See supra paragraph following note 179 (describing examples such as a homosexual
contractor who refuses a request to build the new headquarters for a Christian ministry).
260. 491 U.S. at 414.
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3. Political Speech: It's Not Just for Politicians
Third, courts must be careful to protect political speech from
far-reaching public accommodation laws. Occasionally, the message
that an entity refuses to endorse may be a political one, which
strengthens its First Amendment claim. In Citizens United, the Court
held that "political speech must prevail against laws that would
suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence." 261 In Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, the Court stated that "there is
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs."262 Considering the continuing controversy surrounding the
federal Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") passed in 1996,263 in
addition to the often contentious battles surrounding the marriage
amendments adopted by thirty states, 264 it is a plausible argument
that expression on such topics should be deemed political.
Additionally, at least one influential scholar advocates a broad
interpretation of political speech which would almost certainly
encompass the expression in both Elane Photography and Ocean
Grove.265 Cass Sunstein suggests that political speech should include
all speech which "is both intended and received as a contribution to
public deliberation about some issue."266 Sunstein adds that this
deliberation can deal with "social norms" or "legal requirements" and
mentions "an attack on private discrimination against homosexuals"
as an example of political speech. 267 This theory gives added weight to
the proposition that courts should be very reluctant to enforce a public
accommodation law when it infringes on an entity's expression
regarding such topics.

261. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010).
262. 435 U.S. 829, 838 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
263. See, e.g., State Sues U.S. Over Marriage Law, WASH. POST, July 9, 2009, at A02;
WATCH,
DOMA
Act
(DOMA),
of
Marriage
Defense
Federal
http://www.domawatch.org/about/federaldoma.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2010).
264. See, e.g., Press Release, Alliance Def. Fund, Wis. Supreme Court Upholds Will of the
People on Marriage, (May 30, 2008), available at http://www.alhancedefensefund.orgtNews
/PRDetail/4098; Press Release, Alliance Def. Fund, Court Affirms Will of Oregon Voters:
available
at
2008),
(May
22,
Constitutional
Amendment
Marriage
http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/News/PRDetail/1872 (last visited Feb. 14, 2011); Press
Release, Alliance Def. Fund, ADF Attorney Available to the Media Following Debate on Arizona
Marriage Amendment (May 22, 2008), available at http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/news
/pressrelease.aspx?cid=4539.
265. CASs R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 130-31 (The Free

Press 1995) (1993).
266. Id. at 130 (emphasis omitted).
267. Id. at 131.
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4. Applying Hurley to Balance Competing Interests
Fourth, once a court has found that an entity's conduct is
expressive and determined that the conduct does actually violate the
public accommodation law as written, it must balance the alleged
governmental interests to be served against the importance of
preserving First Amendment protections. While action by the
legislatures and courts in the previous steps will likely address many
situations before they reach this point, this step is nonetheless
critically important to the cases to which it applies.
At this step, courts must first decide what level of scrutiny is
appropriate. While a law such as New Mexico's public accommodation
statute may seem, on its face, to be content neutral, its application
will sometimes require endorsement of specific messages. And
legislation that has the effect of compelling certain types of speech
should not be considered content neutral, but rather should be subject
268
to strict scrutiny.
Because, as the Court stated in Hurley, "[t]he Speech Clause
has no more certain antithesis" than a speech restriction which is
"used to produce thoughts and statements," 269 courts should apply the
"traditional First Amendment analysis" 270 when expressive conduct is
at issue. In short, the court puts the government interest on one side
of the scale, and the individual interest on the other. If the
government's interest is "forbidding acts of discrimination ... to
produce a society free of the corresponding biases," and this interest
infringes on the individual's First Amendment free speech interests,
271
the First Amendment must prevail.
Under Hurley, the federal public accommodation law as well as
more traditional state laws will still be enforceable in most cases
because these laws target, on the whole, nonexpressive activity. Only
broadly written and broadly construed laws that include virtually all
businesses and define "protected class" to include a wide range of
groups will be consistently problematic.
CONCLUSION
Public accommodation laws were historically designed to
ensure that individuals were not discriminated against in access to
268. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 578-79
(1995); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994).
269. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 578-79.
270. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000) (discussing the analysis in Hurley).
271. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 578-79.
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inns, public conveyances, and places of amusement, such as theaters,
based on their race or color. 272 But the drastic expansion of the
to
coverage of the laws and the groups to which they apply has led 273
unnecessary conflict with First Amendment rights of expression.
Unfortunately, some courts have issued rulings that incorrectly-and
unconstitutionally-limit free speech by compelling individuals and
businesses to communicate messages or affirm beliefs with which they
disagree.27 4 Elane Photographyis an example of this, as the court not
only failed to recognize the activity as expressive, but also failed to
appropriately evaluate whether discrimination had even taken place.
The solution to this problem is two-fold. First, legislatures
must take responsibility to draft public accommodation laws narrowly,
with an eye toward the original purpose and scope of such laws. By
carefully defining what businesses are public accommodations, as well
as what groups are to be considered a protected class, legislatures
would eliminate many unnecessary clashes between free speech rights
and anti-discrimination laws. Second, courts must narrowly construe
the law at issue, being careful not to find discrimination when the
individual or business is simply refusing to endorse a particular
message. Courts must also carefully evaluate whether the activity is
expressive.27 5 And courts must recognize, as Hurley established, that
when there is a conflict between free276 speech and public
accommodation law, free speech must prevail.
James M. Gottry*

272. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, 336 (1875), invalidated by The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); see also Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006).
273. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
274. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
275. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,
410-11 (1974)).
276. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 578-79.
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